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Traditional healers are a source of health care for which Africans have always paid (Van
der Geest 1992) and even with the expansion of modern medicine healers are still popular
and command fees exceeding the average treatment cost at most modern practitioners.1 A
possible explanation is that traditional healers have access to valuable and effective therapies
unavailable to modern providers. Another view — more widely-held among public health
policy-makers — is that they are charlatans who consistently dupe their clients. According
to this view, traditional healers exhibit some or all of the following characteristics: they
serve only the poor who cannot afford modern medicine; they serve the ignorant who do not
know better; they cure patients who are not really sick or would have gotten better anyway;
or they take advantage of a temporary placebo effect to collect payment before the patient
feels ill again.
This paper advances the unique view that traditional healers, as a whole, do not possess
any super-natural power nor do they cheat their clients, rather that they use important
elements of their practice to credibly deliver unobservable medical effort and therefore high
quality care. I present a stylized description of the practice of traditional healers garnered
from open-ended interviews with healers in Cameroun, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Traditional
medicine contrasts with modern medicine in payment method, the focus on the role of
the patient, and the ability to enforce contracts; findings supported by the sociological
and anthropological literature. An important element of their practice has previously been
ignored: traditional healers use outcome-contingent contracts. The mystique surrounding
their practice is not unimportant, however. These contracts are only implementable because
patients believe that traditional healers are the representatives of higher powers and can
therefore verify outcomes.
The success of traditional healers stems from the fact that the other forms of health
care available to patients (government-run facilities and church-run (mission) facilities) do
1In Kenya "[t]he average patient treatment cost per visit (in cash) reported by healers was 46 Ksh, far
more than the mean charges even in the private health facilities" (Mwabu, Ainsworth and Nyamete 1993).
In Cameroun the average cost of a visit to a traditional healer is larger than that at either government or
church run clinics (Leonard 2000).
not use outcome-contingent contracts. Health care suffers from asymmetric information
because the patient cannot evaluate the appropriateness of practitioner effort. Outcome-
contingent contracts are a standard solution to this problem. However, unlike many other
production processes, medical effort can be evaluated by other doctors. This fact allows for
a second incentive-aligning mechanism; effort-based regulation, used in both government
and mission health systems. Outcome-contingent contracts align incentives and therefore
improve outcomes, patient utility and welfare. Furthermore, if regulators value patient
health, effort-based regulation can also align incentives, improve outcomes, patient utility
and welfare. Throughout Africa missions retain much more control over their staff than do
governments and their employees therefore have better incentives to provide effort. When
patients choose between traditional healers, government centers and mission centers they are
choosing between outcome-contingent contracts and effort-based regulation at institutions
with low-powered incentives and at institutions with high-powered incentives.
A direct, but unavailable, test of the advantages of different contracts would randomly
allocate patients and illnesses to different contract types and contrast outcomes. I do observe
outcomes at patient-selected practitioners, but selection will bias the results. Indeed, across
Africa there are consistent patterns in the choice of health care practitioner according to
illness condition: certain conditions tend to lead to visits to certain practitioners (Mwabu
1986)). If patients know something about the contracts available at different practitioners
and something about the type of resources required to diagnose and cure their condition
they could be choosing practitioners based on this information. Rather than correct for
self-selection I exploit it as evidence of patients' understanding of the resources that are
available at different practitioners, and thus, contract forms.
Using household level data on patient behavior collected in the South-West province of
Cameroun this paper explores the choice that patients make between these three types of
providers. I develop a simple model of the incentives to provide unobservable medical effort
under each contract. This allows me to identify the conditions under which we expect one
contract to be superior to another. I use data on what patients knew about their illness before
they sought care to categorize illnesses by their degree of responsiveness to medical effort,
patient effort and capacity or skill. If traditional healers provide higher levels of effort than
government centers (mission centers) the probability of a visit to a traditional healer over
a government center (mission center) should increase with the responsiveness of an illness
condition to medical effort. The complementarity of medical and patient effort is also put
forward as a potentially important factor in the choice of practitioner. When conditions are
highly responsive to both medical and patient effort simultaneously the outcome-contingent
contract of the traditional healer should have an advantage over effort-based regulation. This
results from the fact that practitioners rewarded on the basis of their own effort retain no
incentive to encourage or respond to patient effort, but that practitioners rewarded on the
basis of outcomes benefit from the impact of patient effort on outcomes.
I run a conditional logit regression over the choice of these three types of practitioner
using individual characteristics, illness condition characteristics and travel costs. The results
suggest that patients choose to visit traditional healers in patterns that are consistent with
traditional healers providing more medical effort than government centers and effort on par
with mission centers. They do provide more effort than any center when the responsiveness
to medical and patient effort is simultaneously high.
The following section is a description of my interviews with traditional healers. Their
practices are different from those of modern providers in obvious ways, but in this section I
focus on the subtle and less obvious features of their practices that I think make traditional
healers different from other types of providers. Section 2 looks at the incentives to provide
unobservable medical effort under both outcome-contingent and effort-based regulation.
Ironically, it is the practice of the traditional healer that is the easiest to model, as effort-
based regulation requires additional assumptions about what the regulator optimizes and
the monitoring technology available. The model allows me to map out the circumstances
under which outcome—contingent contracts are most likely to lead to superior outcomes when
compared to effort-contingent regulation. Section 3 introduces the data set and preliminary
observations. Section 4 presents the results of a conditional logit estimation using illness
characteristic data as well as individual characteristics. Illness characteristics are significant
determinants of a visit to a traditional healer and the patterns observed are compatible with
the theory that patients visit traditional healers to take advantage of the unique contract
they offer. Section 5 concludes.
1 Traditional Healers
A random sample of 800 households in South-West Province of Cameroun (this data is
discussed in greater detail in section 3) suggests that patients who visit traditional healers
make different payments if they are cured than if they are not cured. Two types of payments
were identified in the survey, those made before and those made after treatment. For patients
who were cured of their ailments the average total payment both before and after was 6,500
CFA (approximately 13 USD), whereas those not cured paid 3,300 CFA (p=0.077). Payments
made after the initial consultation varied even more: 5,000 CFA in successful cases compared
to 1,400 CFA in unsuccessful cases (p=0.047). For visits to modern practitioners payments
are higher in unsuccessful cases (often requiring additional expense on medication) though
the difference is not significant.
Preliminary research on this question was based on personal observation gained from
living in rural Gabon and information contained in several anthropological and medical
studies of traditional healers in Zaire, Burundi, South Africa, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast,
Botswana, Zimbabwe and general sources (Korse et al. 1989, Baerts 1989, Edwards 1983,
Oyenye and Orubuloye 1985, Lasker 1981, Staugard 1985, Gelfand et al. 1985, Normann
1990, Conco 1972). To confirm the patterns suggested by the literature and the survey of
the ill I interviewed traditional healers in three African countries; Cameroun, Tanzania and
Ethiopia. Three interviews with healers were conducted in Cameroun, 5 in Tanzania and 7
in Ethiopia.2 The interviews were open-ended and focused primarily on the following:
2I interviewed un-advertised healers who lived in rural areas. This includes a wide variety from herbalists
• The procedure for reviewing and accepting a patient.
• The method for obtaining information about the condition presented.
• The use of 'modern' medicines.
• The method and timing of payments for a disease episode.
• The use of enchantments or spells to encourage timely payment.
The basic findings were similar in Tanzania and Cameroun, with a few differences in
Ethiopia.
1.1 Tanzania and Cameroun
Healers in Tanzania and Cameroun accepted almost all cases presented. Though they were
often known for certain specialties, all claimed to have a variety of skills. Among the problems
they specifically mentioned treating were stomach problems, irregular menses, infertility, im-
potence, distended abdomen, swelling in the extremities, migraine headaches, convulsions,
eye problems, bone-setting, mental illnesses, sexually transmitted diseases, chest pain, mal-
nutrition and worms.
Though most examinations of patients were much longer and more detailed than those
of their modern medical counterparts, few involved physical examination. Most healers said
they asked extensive questions about the symptoms in order to gather information. Many
said they could form a preliminary diagnosis from interviews with other family members who
came to ask for help (Conco (pp 294), Staugard (pp 74-81).)
Healers often integrated the entire family in treatment when they thought it was neces-
sary. They did this in three ways: first they consulted family members to learn more about
the causes of the disease; second they would use family members integrally in the cure, espe-
cially if the patient was returning home; and third they prescribed and proscribed habits for
to spirit channelers to religious scribes. Mid-wives who also treated illnesses were included.
family members as well as for the patient. A healer I interviewed in Tanzania regarded the
families of alcoholics as his patients (since it was generally they and not the alcoholic who
sought care) and gave medicine to both the alcoholic and her family. Even when families
were not involved, the treatment regimes of traditional healers required significant participa-
tion on the part of the patient.3 Many directed patients to fulfill certain sacramental rites, to
prepare certain foods or to avoid certain activities (Conco (pp 291-294), Staugard (pp 112,
124), Baerts (pp 31-32).)
Healers in Cameroun specifically disavowed the use of any modern medicines, however,
one healer in Tanzania said that he did use modern medicines when he thought they were
useful. He did not tell patients that he was doing so, choosing to add the medication
discretely to what would otherwise appear to be a herbal therapy. Mwabu et al. (1993, pp
851) found in Kenya that 74 percent of healers possessed anti-malaria drugs. Oyenye and
Orubuloye (pp 9) mention that in Nigeria (neighboring the Cameroun survey area) there
have been a number of scandals in which healers were accused of this practice and that it
was considered offensive but widely practiced. Thus, it is highly unlikely that I would get
direct answers from healers in Cameroun. Informal discussions with non-healers suggest the
practice is wide-spread.
Healers often asked for an initial payment, which frequently included a symbolic gift like
a hen and/or a machete.4 Cash payments were very common. The fixed payment often varied
according to the problem but not according to the ability of the patient to pay. In some cases
the healers would accept a promise to pay at a later point, but usually they asked for the
initial payment up front.
In addition to the initial payment the healer would often negotiate with the patient over a
payment to be made in the future. In all cases, if the treatment did not result in improvement
of the condition the patient paid nothing beyond the initial payment. This was the case even
3I did not observe consultations or treatments. This particular information comes from what I was told
by the healers and observations by other scholars.
4The blood of a hen is used in many medicines as a type of base. The machete was used to cut those
herbs that the healer said must be cut with a new knife.
when patients lived with and were cared for and fed by the healer during treatment. Healers
in Tanzania and Cameroun did not charge for medicines administered.
Often the final payment was left open, with the expectation that some payment would be
made in the future. The healer developed an expectation of what his compensation should
be after he saw the result of his treatment. The patient also developed an expectation of the
payment and then they bargained to reach a conclusion. This is not an uncommon way to
decide compensation for services rendered, especially in Cameroun. Though it might seem
that the healer has no power to bargain after he has cured someone, I will show that he
bargains from a position of considerable strength.
In some cases no further payment was required and the healers reported that future
payments were 'up to the charity' of the patient. I distinguish this from the previous case
by the fact that the healers claimed they expected no payment. However, they were also
clear that everyone who had been cured made some payment. These were healers who dealt
almost exclusively with people from their own larger community. I found that healers with
wide-spread reputations who often dealt with patients from outside their community were
much more specific about their expectations of payment.
Almost every healer said of the second payment that they expected less from people who
were less able to pay and all healers expected that any large payments would be made at
harvest time or in kind. Many waited years for final payments (see Staugard (pp 103, 112,
113) and Korse et al. (pp 44-47).) There was no indication that healers were quick to declare
victory and collect their bills. In one case a healer who specialized in infertility told me that
he waited until the child was 7 years old before he considered the mother to have been cured
of infertility!
When asked about the practice of poisoning patients for non-payment many healers
were adamant that they never engaged in the practice,5 though almost all admitted that
their ancestors, or specifically parents, had done so. The practice traditionally operated
5This practice is what transformed a healer into a witch doctor in the eyes of colonial officers and it is
not surprising that many healers would be anxious that I had understood them on this point.
as follows: when a patient refused to pay the healer, would either invoke a curse on the
patient or revoke the cure. Neither of these actions took place in the presence of the patient.
They are considered to be among the strongest forms of magic. This practice invokes near
universal fear in rural populations, and most non-healers believed that if they failed to pay
they would be poisoned. This is a very useful belief for healers, since they need only wait
until the patient eventually falls sick of anything. All healers told me stories of patients
leaving without paying and then returning, sometimes years later, begging to be allowed to
pay. That patients believe poisoning is still practiced allows healers to wait until after the
treatment to collect payment without fear that the patient will refuse to pay.
1.2 Ethiopia
The practices of many traditional healers interviewed in Ethiopia were different than those
of Cameroun and Tanzania. Most healers specialized in at most 3 or 4 medicines and their
corresponding illnesses. They were known popularly as 'the healer who has a good medicine
for . . . .' They almost always charged a fixed price for a fixed dose with exceptions only for
the extremely poor and their own family members. When asked if they accepted payment
after giving the medicines they almost all said no, that in fact receipt of payment was part
of the ceremony of preparation. They did not examine patients except in the case of demon
possession.
I interviewed two healers in Ethiopia who used payment schemes similar to those dis-
cussed in section 1.1. Both treated a wide variety of diseases, as did the healers interviewed
in Cameroun and Tanzania. In the sample, contingent payment schemes were perfectly as-
sociated with healers who cured a wide variety of diseases and fixed payment schemes were
perfectly associated with healers who specialized in only a few medicines. This suggests that
the skill for which only a fixed payment is made is that of preparing well-known medicines,
and the skill for which a contingent payment was made is that of diagnosing diseases.
The practices of traditional healers are steeped in tradition and mystique. All healers
see their practices within the context of culture and tradition and many were reluctant
to talk about payment. Nonetheless, they are all paid for their services, whether in kind
or in cash. The form of payment along with some of the other aspects of their practice
form a pattern in which traditional healers face very different incentives to care for their
patients than other providers. Traditional healers exert great resources in examination and
the derivation of diagnoses. They specifically direct patients as to their own responsibilities
in treatment. They use outcome—contingent contracts. They use the element of 'magic' to
enforce contracts. I found evidence that they might use modern medicines.
2 Effort and Capacity
Patients visit a health care practitioner to benefit from the intervention of health care in
the course of an illness. I simplify the intervention of health care into two components; that
of effort and that of capacity. Capacity, or skill should be thought of as a location-specific
constant, derived from the availability of equipment, medicines, the training of the personnel
posted at the center, etc. Capacity is observable: hospitals have more capacity than clinics
and clinics more capacity than traditional healers. Effort is a variable input and cannot
be directly observed, but is at least as important as capacity. Being in the best equipped
hospital in the world is of no use to a patient if no one will care for her. I assume modern
medicine is clearly superior to traditional medicine in terms of capacity; the comparative
advantage of traditional medicine is in the provision of effort.
Effort in health care is a classic example of hidden action (Arrow 1963, Dranove and
White 1987). The patient cannot evaluate what the doctor is doing for her sake. People
visit doctors because doctors have superior knowledge of diseases and treatments. Similarly,
the practitioner cannot observe the effort that the patient exerts for her own health. This is
important because many health improving activities cause disutility that the patient would
prefer to avoid. I take a broad view of patient effort in this paper and consider it to be
the collection of all efforts of family members in the production of health. Most services
commonly associated with nursing in the west are performed by family members in Africa.
Patients can know the level of capacity provided and can therefore evaluate the benefit
they can expect to receive from it. However they cannot directly know the level of effort
exerted. Therefore it is important to examine the incentives of each practitioner to exert
effort. When the patient observes that practitioners have strong incentives to exert effort
and effort matters for the condition from which she suffers, she will anticipate greater benefit
to her health.
2.1 Medical Effort at Traditional Healers
The outcome-contingent contract offered by the traditional healer creates incentives for the
practitioner to exert effort. To show this I introduce a simple model of health seeking
behavior. A combination of capacity (5), medical effort (m) and patient effort (p) will lead
to some expected value of health gain, H = h(s,m,p). A change of H units in health will
have some effect on utility, and we choose a simple form where the benefit to the patient is
a fixed amount (w) per unit of health. Following Grossman (1975) w can be thought of as
the opportunity cost of time and H as the change in the amount of time available for work
or leisure. Thus, when a patient falls sick, she is presented with an investment opportunity
in which the purchase of inputs can lead to a potentially large gain in health. The value
of health care comes not from how sick she might be, but the magnitude of the change in
health status that health care can achieve.
Patients agree to share some of the benefits of this gain with traditional healers. The
payment to the traditional healer is a share (r) of the value of the outcome plus some fixed
payment (F). The exertion of effort has a cost and I assume a per unit cost of one.6 Thus
the healer's expected gain from treating a patient will be the up-front fees plus his share
6Because effort has no intuitive units this is not an assumption but a normalization. With a general
specification of welfare W = h(p, m) — c(p) — d(m), define new measures of medical effort and patient effort
such that p' = c(p) and m' = d{m) to get W = h(c~1(p'),d~l{m')) — p' — m', or W = h'(p', m') — p' — m!.
Since neither p nor m was measured in observable units, converting to p' or m! is arbitrary.
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minus the disutility of his effort.
Ym = F + rwh(s,m,p) - m (1)
By increasing his effort the practitioner can increase his expected payment. The traditional
healer will choose to exert effort at the point where the marginal benefit is equal to the
marginal cost. This level of effort is always less than the optimal level of effort when r < 1.
The patient also retains incentives to exert effort and her utility will be the share of the
value of health retained, minus the disutility of effort exerted, minus the fixed fees, minus
the travel costs.
Up= (1 - r)wh{s,m,p) - p - F - TC (2)
Patients will exert effort until the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. Again, this
level of effort is less than the optimal level when (1 — r) < 1.
Definition 1 (Responsiveness to Medical Effort) An illness condition A is more re-
sponsive to medical effort than illness condition B if, ceteris paribus, the return to medical
effort for condition A is greater than for condition B.
dhA(s,m,p) dhB(s,m,p)
a > a Vs,ra,p
Definition 2 (Responsiveness to Patient Effort) An illness condition A is more re-
sponsive to patient effort than illness condition B if, ceteris paribus, the return to patient
effort for condition A is greater than for condition B.
dhA(s,m,p) dhB(s,m,p)
> V 5 m pdp dp
I assume that h(s:m,p) has the properties of a standard production function (J^ > 0,
J^ < 0), and therefore, if one condition has a higher marginal benefit of effort for every
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level of effort the equilibrium level of effort will be higher for that condition.
Proposition 1 For two diseases with otherwise identical production functions, if illness A
is more responsive to medical effort than illness B, more medical effort will be provided for
illness A.
Proposition 2 For two diseases with otherwise identical production functions, if illness A
is more responsive to patient effort than illness B, more patient effort will be provided for
illness A.
Despite the fact that patients cannot observe medical effort, traditional healers will provide
generally high (though not optimal) levels of effort that are increasing in the responsiveness
of the disease to medical effort.
2.2 Medical effort at other practitioners
Why then do we not observe these contracts more frequently in health care? A contingent-fee
scheme depends on the practitioner's knowing the outcome of the disease. If the practitioner
does not know the outcome he cannot insure that the patient makes the proper payments.
Outcomes are difficult to observe, and more difficult to verify. Often, when the patient leaves
the clinic or hospital, the outcome is not yet known by anyone. If government centers were
paid on the basis of outcomes, patients would have strong incentives to lie or not return.7
The healer is able to use outcome-contingent contracts because he maintains a cloud of
mystery over his practice that encourages people to tell the truth about their condition.
The institution of quality assurance commonly observed in Africa is direct monitoring of
the practitioner (effort-based regulation). The employer of the practitioner does not seek to
know the outcome of treatment but does observe other outcomes that give information about
7There are some health events that produce observable outcomes, for example, the outcome of a normal
delivery — the health of mother and child are known before either returns home. In another work resulting
from this data collection effort Ndeso-Atanga (2000) reports that outcome-contingent appreciation (tipping)
is the cultural norm for childbirth services. Observability appears to lead to exactly the contracts that we
have described at traditional healers.
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the effort of the practitioners. Practitioners produce both health for the patient and what
I call organizational quality. This second output is observed by the employer. Records are
kept of the various activities that go into producing health. Typically a selection of records
are examined during a site visit. The patients' symptoms and complaints are part of all
records and therefore procedures and records should follow protocols developed for each set
of complaints. If a particular record or collection of records is determined to be in violation
of standards the practitioner is punished in accordance with the gravity of the deviation.
These practitioners provide quality effort because if they do not, they will be punished.
The penalty for deviation varies between the two organizational practitioners examined in
this paper. Supervisors of government facilities do not have the power to fire, promote or
demote or give bonuses to personnel.8 Church-based supervisors, on the other hand, can fire,
promote or demote personnel when justified and discretionary bonuses are common. Thus,
mission personnel will exert more effort and adhere closer to protocols than government
personnel.
Organizational quality is a measure specifically designed to be highly correlated with
outcomes. It can be seen as a production function (q(m, s)) that is similar to the production
function for health itself. Practitioners seek to maximize their utility by choosing m that
equates the marginal change in q with the marginal disutility of effort and exert more effort
when the responsiveness of organizational quality to medical effort is larger. Assuming q is
correlated with /i, medical effort should increase when the responsiveness of h to medical
effort is high, i.e. protocols are appropriately designed. However, since q is not a measure of
outcomes the change in q with respect to p must be zero {-^ = 0). Examination of records
would show that correct diagnostic procedures were used and that correct medicines were
prescribed but they would be unable to show whether or not the patient took her medicines
81 was present for a number of supervision visits to government centers. By reviewing records the
supervisor was able to form a surprisingly detailed picture of the quality of the center, which in one case
was particularly dismal. At that center the supervisor severely berated the staff during the visit. As we left
I asked him what he would do if he returned and found the same conditions. He said there was nothing he
could do, and then pointed out that this was his fourth consecutive visit in which he had found the same
problems and admonished the staff in the same manner.
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correctly, for example.
2.3 Joint determination of medical and patient effort
Both the outcome-contingent contract and effort-based regulation can deliver high levels
of medical effort. However, if both medical and patient effort are necessary the outcome-
contingent contract cannot achieve the full information solution (Holmstrom 1982). When
r is less than one and greater than zero both the patient and practitioner do not face the
full incentives. On the other hand, effort-based regulation can, in theory, achieve the full
information solution. In general, it will not do so for a variety of reasons; monitoring is
imperfect and neither governments nor missions are pure social welfare maximizers. Since
neither regulation nor welfare maximizing play a role in the traditional healer contract, these
failures in effort-based regulation might increase the relative advantage of traditional healers.
In addition, the fact that patient effort is important in health care suggests a more fun-
damental difference between the two types of contracts. For outcome-contingent contracts,
the level of effort provided by either the practitioner or the patient will depend on the level
of effort provided by the other. Changes in the patients' expectation of medical effort will
change the optimal level of patient effort. If medical and patient effort are complements then
the expectation of higher medical effort will lead to higher patient effort and, in parallel, the
expectation of higher patient effort will lead to higher medical effort.
Proposition 3 / / the cross-partial of health with respect to medical and patient effort is
positive an increase in patient effort will lead to an increase in medical effort.
Define m*(p) to be the function describing the optimal level of medical effort given the





With decreasing marginal returns, if the cross-partial is positive, then the change in the
optimal m with respect to p is positive.
The healer has a direct incentive to encourage patients to exert effort; if patient effort
increases the expected outcome, it increases the practitioner's expected payment. Proposi-
tion 3 shows that there is a second effect of patient effort which depends on whether patient
and medical effort are complements. If efforts are complements the more effort the patient
exerts the more useful is the effort of the practitioner. The effect of these incentives can be
seen in the degree to which healers concentrate on encouraging or forcing patients to exert
effort, as discussed in section 1.1.
I propose that medical and patient effort can be characterized as complements. The
patient seeks the care of a practitioner precisely because she cannot do what the practitioner
does. Though there are some areas in which patients could substitute for practitioner effort
these have already been exploited in Africa. Patients and their families already provide
a number of medical services typically provided by nurses in the west.9 For the activities
that remain, medical and patient effort are not substitutes, but, are they complements?
The things a patient can do incorrectly (that would not be observable) include not taking
medication as prescribed, not looking for important signs of a worsening condition or not
bothering to notify the practitioner if they are observed, not resting long enough, not eating
properly or not observing proper hygiene, to name just a few. These failures on the part of
the patient are not trivial concerns — they can render the best therapy useless.
Though the cross partial of health with respect to patient and medical effort is positive,
the cross partial of organizational quality is zero, because patient effort is not observed by
regulators. This does not prevent the regulator from achieving the optimal solution; he
can act as a Stackelberg leader if he has information about the patient's reaction function.
However, experience suggests that health regulators, far from knowing the reaction function
of patients, see patients as passive players in their own health, and do not take into account
9Van der Geest and Sarkodie (1998) provide an eye-opening description of life as a patient in a typical
African hospital, including the extensive reliance on family to provide important nursing functions.
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the effort of the patient at any level.
In a separate investigation a team with which I participated observed consultations by
practitioners at government and mission hospitals and clinics in Tanzania.10 Of 450 con-
sultations observed, in only 16% (17% at government and 11% at mission facilities) did the
doctor tell the patient what the diagnosis was or what medicine was being prescribed. In
only 6% of cases (7% at government and 5% at mission) did the doctor inform the patient of
any activity that she could undertake to increase the chance of recovery or to avoid a similar
illness in the future. Of cases in which a dispensing nurse gave the patient drugs requiring
that the patient know how or when to take the drug in only 32% (38% at government and
30% at mission) did the nurse check to see if the patient had any idea how to do so. Patient
effort is not a priority in either mission or government organizations. They do not even take
into account the effect of effort on outcomes, much less react to patient provision of effort in
their own decision about how much effort to exert.
2.4 Capacity
Capacity is important in the provision of health but is more readily observable. Each lo-
cation has a fixed level of capacity but illness conditions respond differently to capacity.
In our sample modern providers operate both clinics and hospitals. A mission clinic is,
by design, similar in capacity to a government clinic, and hospitals are also similar. Thus
s E {Bu, Bc, Bh} where Bu is the responsiveness of the illness condition to the capacity
and skills available at a traditional healer, Bc the responsiveness at a clinic and B^ the
responsiveness at a hospital. I assume Bu < Bc < Bh thereby excluding the possibility that
traditional healers have any special, much less supernatural, skill.
Proposition 4 Conditions in which the difference in responsiveness to capacity between
types of centers is greater lead to a greater difference in the benefits of visiting those types of
centers.
10Research was sponsored and carried out by Dr Mpuya under the auspices of the District Medical Office
of Iringa, Tanzania with the support of Centro Universitario Aspiranti Medici Missionari.
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For example, if Bc — Bu is smaller for one condition than another, the difference in expected
benefit of visiting a clinic and an untrained practitioner is smaller for the first condition.
The first condition is less responsive to the different levels of skill.
2.5 Patient Selection of Practitioners
The definitions of the word patient include 'one that is acted upon.' Indeed Sen (1995,
pp 11) used this definition in a different context as a contrast to agents: "To see [them]
as patients rather than as agents can undermine the exercise . . . Not to focus on the fact
that they think, choose, act, and respond is to miss something terribly crucial." Just as the
regulator views patients as passive, public health and health economics too often focuses on
the activity of practitioners on passive patients. In Africa, where there is no formal health
insurance system that ties patients to institutions, patients are very active in the exercise of
their freedom to choose a practitioner.
I have suggested the following differences between centers. Traditional healers provide
high levels of effort and encourage patients to do so as well. Mission clinics and hospitals also
provide high levels of effort but do not encourage patients to do so. Government hospitals
and clinics, on the other hand, do not provide high levels of effort. Clinics provide higher
levels of capacity than traditional healers, and hospitals provide higher levels of capacity
than clinics. These differences are known to patients and will lead to distinct patterns in
the choice of practitioner.
Proposition 1 stated that as the responsiveness to medical effort increased the amount
of medical effort provided also increased. Some practitioners have higher powered incentives
to provide effort and this difference will be most important when medical effort has the
greatest impact on outcomes. Since all effort provision is sub-optimal (none of the contracts
achieve the full information solution) an increase in effort is welfare improving. Thus, for
two different illness conditions A and B, and two different practitioners I and II,
Hypothesis 1 / / condition A is more responsive to medical effort than condition B and
practitioner I faces greater incentives to provide unobservable effort than practitioner II then
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the probability of a patient's choosing provider I over II will be higher for condition A than
condition B.
Proof (as well as propositions 2 and 3 that follow) requires specification of functional forms
and is contained in appendix A.
From proposition 4,
Hypothesis 2 / / condition A is more responsive to capacity at a given level of practitioner
(untrained, clinic or hospital) than condition B the probability of a patients choosing that
level over other levels will be higher for condition A than condition B.
Proposition 3 stated that for traditional healers an increase in p leads to an increase in
TO. It is unlikely that this effect exists for organizational practitioners (missions and the
government). If medical effort under effort-based regulation does not increase with the
responsiveness to patient effort then the outcome-contingent contract is more likely to be
superior to effort-based regulation when the responsiveness to patient effort is high.















Figure 1 shows 4 types of conditions where the responsiveness to medical and patient effort
can be low or high. Shown in the table are the levels of effort provided by the traditional
healer and an institutional practitioner with high powered incentives. Practitioners under
both outcome-contingent contracts and effort-based regulation increase medical effort when
Em increases, but only practitioners under outcome-contingent contracts increase effort when
Ep increases. Thus, we have 'low', 'medium' and 'high' efforts for traditional healers and
'low' and 'high' effort for organizational practitioners. 'High' effort at a traditional healer
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cannot be directly compared to 'high' effort at an organizational practitioner, however, the
best a traditional healer can do when compared to an organizational practitioner is when
both practitioners provide 'high' levels of effort. This corresponds to illness conditions where
the responsiveness to both medical and patient effort are high. This intuition leads to the
following hypothesis (a formal proof is given in appendix A.)
Hypothesis 3 / / condition A is more responsive to medical effort than condition B and the
responsiveness to patient effort is high the probability of choosing a traditional healer over
a mission clinic or hospital is higher for condition A than condition B.
Note that, even if the responsiveness to medical effort is high, a patient might prefer
to visit a modern provider since the patient retains the full incentive to exert effort on her
behalf. It is only when she expects that her effort and medical effort could complement each
other that she will seek an outcome—contingent contract.
Travel is a significant factor in the cost of seeking care and patients will always prefer to
reduce travel costs when possible. Thus,
Hypothesis 4 A patient is more likely to visit a practitioner if she lives closer to that
practitioner.
These propositions permit investigation of patient perceptions of the level of effort pro-
vided by traditional healers, government practitioners and mission practitioners. If tradi-
tional healers are providing high levels of effort I should be able to detect this by comparing
the conditions reported at government, mission and traditional practitioners.
3 Data
To examine the role of incentives in the choice of practitioner I use data collected on patient
behavior in the face of illness in Mbonge Sub-Division, in the South-West province of Camer-
oun in 199411. Mbonge sub-division is entirely rural. This area was chosen because of the
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presence of a German aid project which insured a consistent, reasonably-priced drug supply
in all government health centers and hospitals permitting the claim that factors other than
the availability of drugs are driving patients' choices. This fact also suggests that patients
can be relatively sure of receiving some treatment at any location.
40 villages were randomly chosen and 20 randomly selected households from each village
were interviewed. Data were collected on all members of the household. 4,489 individuals
were thus polled, of which 681 illness episodes were reported within the month previous to the
survey. We choose the recall period of a month to increase the quality of the data on illness
visits. I focus on the first location visited in the search for care and 548 of these episodes
resulted in first visits to one of the five types of practitioners examined in this paper (I have
complete data for 533). Other practitioners included drug peddlers, pharmacists, neighbors,
private hospitals, private clinics and parastatal hospitals. Villages sampled were an average
of 28 km from a government clinic, 51 km from a government hospital, 87 km from a mission
clinic and 212 km from a mission hospital.
Table 1 compares patients by their choice of practitioner. The characteristics are divided
into two categories, those of the patient herself and those of the care-giver (the patient
is the default care—giver). The age of the patient is significantly less than the age of the
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care-giver since children make up a significant portion of patients but are never care-givers.
The average reported family income is equivalent to just over 1,500 USD per year. Table 1
gives preliminary support to the hypothesis that people who visit traditional healers are too
poor to use other health facilities. The income of patients who visit traditional healers is
low. Since it appears visitors to traditional healers are older, a more reliable measure is the
income of care-givers and the family wealth. On both of these counts visitors to healers
appear to be among the poorest in the sample. On the other hand, education levels do
not reflect this pattern. We will see that travel costs are a significant factor in the choice
of a practitioner. Access to a road both reduces travel costs and increases incomes (this
is a general phenomenon in Africa). Since traditional healers are located throughout the
sample and government clinics are the most widely distributed of the modern health care
practitioners, it is likely that choosing a healer or government clinic out of geographical
isolation from other centers is correlated with poverty. Since education levels do not have
the same geographical distribution as income and wealth, the same pattern is not observed.
I will show that, when travel costs are taken into account, individuals with higher levels of
income still seek out missions, but there is no effect of care-giver income or family wealth.
3.1 Self-Selection by Illness Condition
Table 2 shows evidence of patient selection of providers. This table reports the outcomes at
different practitioners. Almost 5% of people who visited traditional healers died and healers
Table 2: Episode Outcomes by Provider


























































have the lowest cure rate (looking at both 'cured' and the sum of 'cured' and 'well enough'.)
At first glance, this supports the idea that these practitioners are charlatans. However, by
this measure, the second worst practitioner is the mission hospital. Mission hospitals are,
beyond question, the highest quality centers. The best cure rates are at government clinics
and these are the worst of the modern practitioners. The findings do not reflect quality, but
rather self-selection by illness condition.
Note as well that 30% of the conditions reported at traditional healers involved on-
going treatment; healers are not using temporary placebo effects. Healers appear to refer
some patients, although we do not know if they were referred to modern providers or other
traditional healers.
Table 3: Satisfaction with Treatment by Provider



































The results are even stronger when we look at the satisfaction people express for the
care they received. The highest rate of disappointment is with mission hospitals. One
person in the entire sample was disappointed with the quality of care they received at a
government clinic, 98% were either partially or fully satisfied.12 These numbers do not
say that government clinics are providing high quality care, rather that government clinics
deliver exactly the care patients expect. Government clinics are specializing in easy-to-treat
illnesses, and mission hospitals and traditional healers are tackling the tougher cases.
Information about their illness condition drives patients to incur significant cost in the
search of care. The survey was designed to elicit information that patients had before they
sought care: all of the symptoms they experienced; the self-declared severity of the disease;
12If drugs had not been present at these centers, or more importantly, if they had been irregularly present,
dissatisfaction would undoubtedly have increased.
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the number of days sick before seeking care; and the number of those days in which the
patient was bedridden. A table of symptom prevalence at each provider is included in
appendix B as table 10. This table show strong patterns of selection by illness condition,
but does not provide any rationale for this behavior. With the characteristics of the disease
plus the age and sex of the individual and information about endemic diseases in the area
(but not information on the choice of practitioner or the diagnosis), two doctors and one
nurse (all experienced in rural tropical medicine) independently scored all the cases using
the following definitions:
Responsiveness of the condition to Medical Effort Em The degree to which outcome
depends on the effort of the practitioner.
Responsiveness of the condition to Patient Effort Ep Is there a critical role for the
patient or her family in her treatment?
Responsiveness of the condition to capacity Patients can choose between three levels
of skill and capacity: untrained or informally trained practitioners (Bu), practitioners
at clinics (Bc) and practitioners at hospitals (Bh)-
Range of Outcomes a What is the possibility for a very bad health outcome given the
disease from which the patient suffers?
These scores are referred to as codings A, B and C. In addition to these three sets of
scores, scores were created using basic medical references (Griffith 1985, Strickland, ed 1984,
Werner 1977), referred to as the medical references coding. The correlations between the
scorings is not perfect, but in most cases is significantly positive. The full correlation tables
are reported in appendix B as tables 7, 8 and 9.
4 Empirical Analysis
Individuals choose between three types of practitioners and five locations. Types (indexed by
k) are traditional (TH), government (G) and mission (M). The locations (indexed by j) are
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traditional healers (TH), government clinics (GC), mission clinics (MC), government hospi-
tals (GH) and mission hospitals (MH). Thus k=TE if j=TH, k=G if j=GC or j=GH, and
k=M if j=MC or MH. Coefficients are obtained by maximizing the following log likelihood
with respect to 77, p and 7.
log L = J2ti
p _ exp(rj'jxi+p'kzi+'y'yij)
j
Sij = 1 if the z'th individual visits practitioner j and 0 otherwise.
x is a vector of characteristics of the individual. There is only one vector per individual,
but there are five sets of coefficients, representing the five locations between which a patient
can choose. These coefficients will be referred to as the multinomial coefficients since they
enter the regression as would the regressors of a multinomial logit regression, z is a vector of
information about the illness condition and is only one vector of information with three sets
of coefficients representing traditional healers, governments and missions. These coefficients
are referred to as the hybrid coefficients, and can be thought of as multinomial coefficients
with the additional restriction that the coefficient for government clinics be equal to that of
government hospitals and the coefficient of mission clinics be equal to that of mission hos-
pitals, y is a vector of information about the locations visited corresponding to traditional
healers and government and mission clinics and hospitals. There is only one vector of coeffi-
cients corresponding to y. These are referred to as the conditional coefficients because they
enter the estimation as would the regressors of a conditional logit estimation. Note that in
order to solve the model 7TH and PTH a r e normalized to zero. The regression is just a specific
case of the more general conditional logit model (Maddala 1983, pp 44) and therefore has
the required properties for obtaining a solution.
Explanatory Variables The x variables used in the regressions that follow are the age,
gender, education level, and income (log) of both the patient and her care-giver, as well as
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the family wealth.13 Patient characteristics should capture variation in the value of health.
Care-giver characteristics should capture variation in the ability to transform health care into
health, perceptions of the relative merit of different practitioners, or the ability to negotiate
over the terms of care among other things.
The z variables used are the responsiveness to patient and medical effort (Ep and Em),
the range of outcomes (<j), and the joint effect of medical and patient effort. The obvious
candidate for a variable representing the joint effect is Ep • Em, however, Ep, Em, and Ep • Em
are collinear.14 Since Ep • Em — EpEm — EmEp is correlated with Ep • Em but not Ep or Em
I use it to measure the joint effect of medical and patient effort. When the coefficient for
this variable is positive the effect of an increase in Ep (Em) is increasing in Em (Ep).
The y variables used in the following regressions are the travel cost to each practitioner
and the responsiveness of the condition to capacity. Note that traditional healers, gov-
ernments and missions differ in their response to the characteristics of the illness, clinics
differ from hospitals in travel costs and skill and all locations differ from each other in their
relationship to individual characteristics.
Illness Characteristic Data There are four data sets on the characteristics of each ill-
ness, corresponding to the four codings. Each variable is not perfectly correlated with its
corresponding variable across all data sets. However, the collection of variables in each data
set comprises a medical opinion about the condition faced by the patient, and therefore a
more interesting test is the degree to which the 'opinions' reach the same conclusion. I create
a weighted score for each variable (Ep, Emj <r, Bu, Bc, Bh). The average score would be
a weight of 0.25 on each coding, for example. The weight assigned to each scoring is fixed
for all variables. Fixing the weight for medical references to 1, I find the optimal weights
13Family wealth is the log of predicted total family income obtained by regressing actual total income on
observable characteristics of the household (roofing material, type of floor, ownership of durables, etc.). This
helps to avoid the strong correlation, for adult males, between income and total family income. In addition,
if a family had an outside source of income this should be partially captured in the instrumented family
wealth.
14Ep and Em together explain 94%(Med Refs), 96% (A), 97% (B) and 99% (C) of the variance in Ep • Em.
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for the other three codings; where optimal is maximum likelihood for the conditional logit
regression described above. Table 4 records the weights obtained.











A test that the weights of A, B and C are not equal to zero fails to reject the null (that
they are all equal to zero) at the 5% level. A test that the weight on the medical reference
coding is zero is rejected (p-value 0.0000). The coding by medical references does the best
job of explaining the observed pattern of visits (it has the largest weight). Furthermore,
the other codings contain information that is made largely redundant by the information
contained in the coding by medical references. Thus, I present the results for the regression
using medical references coding.
4.1 Results
Table 5 reports the coefficients and z-tests for the regression on medical references. The
coefficients for the traditional healer are normalized to 0, so, for example, the negative
coefficient on the age of the patient in the column for the government clinic implies that
increasing the age of the patient increases the probability of a visit to a traditional healer
over a government clinic. Variations in the age, education and income of patients are the
only significant predictors of visits among individual and care-giver characteristics. Visitors
to traditional healers are not less educated than visitors to other practitioners and they are
more educated than visitors to mission clinics. They earn less income than visitors to mission
centers, but are not from poorer families.
The collection of illness condition characteristics play a significant role in the choice of
practitioner. The responsiveness of the illness condition to patient effort does not appear
to play any direct role in the choice of practitioner. The responsiveness to medical effort
is significantly negative for visits to government centers, and negative, but insignificant for
visits to mission centers. Hypothesis 1 stated that if one practitioner exerted more effort
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than another, patients are more likely to visit the high effort practitioner when they suffer
from a condition that is responsive to medical effort. Thus, patients choose practitioners as
if they believed that traditional healers provide more effort then either government clinics or
hospitals and similar levels of effort to mission clinics and hospitals. In addition, the joint
effect of efforts is significant for both government and mission practitioners. Thus patients
are more likely to visit traditional healers when the responsiveness to both medical and




































































































































log likelihood = -702.88
46.3 % of predictions correct
The coefficient for capacity is significant and positive meaning that as the benefit of
capacity for the patient's illness condition at a given practitioner increases the likelihood of
a visit to that practitioner also increases, confirming hypothesis 2. In addition the coefficient
for travel is significant, confirming hypothesis 4; patients prefer to travel shorter distances if
they can.
Table 6 shows the marginal effects of the independent variables on the choice of practi-
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tioner derived from the 4 sets of coefficients of the logit. Each element can be read as the
percentage change in the probability of visiting a practitioner given a one percent change
in the respective variable from its average value. Elasticities for the responsiveness to med-
ical effort are reported at three different values of the responsiveness to patient effort, (low
is 20th percentile and high is 80th percentile.) Elasticities are not reported for individual
characteristics with no significant coefficients.
Table 6: Elasticity of Probabilities with Explanatory Variables
probabilities at x
Percent Change in
Trad Heal Gov Clinic Mis Clinic
0.093 0.299 0.260 0.277 0.070
Probability of Visit with a 1% change in explanatory variable





Em for Ep low
Em for Ep medium




































Increasing the level of education has a strong positive impact on the probability of a visit
to a traditional healer, with the difference coming from visitors to mission clinics. I do not
believe education is really driving these results, it is a proxy for some other important but
unobserved variable. However, this does strongly contradict the hypothesis that it is only
the ignorant who visit traditional healers.
Reducing the income of a patient does reduce the probability of a visit to a traditional
healer. The fact that family wealth and care-giver income do not have this effect imply that
it is not the case that only the poor visit traditional healers, but there is some remaining
preference for traditional healers among the poor. Notice (from table 5) that traditional
healers are differentiated from mission centers, not from government centers, by the income
of patients. If healers were the only option available to the poor they would be differentiated
from government centers by income. It appears that, when a poor person has a condition
that would be best treated at a mission facility but cannot afford the mission center, she
goes to the traditional healer. The traditional healer is a substitute for high quality, not low
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quality. This could be a result of the implied credit and subsidy available in the contract
at a traditional healer. Poor patients are asked to pay less and even that is in kind and
when the patient is able. Mission centers attempt to reduce fees for the poor, but a major
component of the cost of a visit to a mission center is travel costs, which cannot be reduced
or forgiven.
Age appears to play an important role, but I have no particular hypothesis about the
role it should play. Age could contain some uncaptured information about income earning
opportunities. It might contain information about unobserved variations in illness conditions
but this should have been taken into account in the codings.
When the range of possible outcomes is larger the probability of a visit to a government
facility is increased, whereas the probability of a visit to a mission center or traditional healer
is decreased. The effect is quite strong at traditional healers. I hypothesize that this variable
captures information about the urgency of care. If there is a health crisis, patients will always
find someone present at a government clinic or hospital. Traditional healers are not on call
and do not have stocks of medicine on hand. Mission centers, as well, are generally further
away, and thus less useful in the case of urgency. This analysis is poorly suited to address
this issue because we examine only the first location visited even if the bulk of care was
received at another place. Our survey did not ask about the main care provider.
The effect of an increase in the responsiveness to medical effort on the probability of
visiting a traditional healer is small when the responsiveness to patient effort is low, but
quite significant when the responsiveness to patient effort is high. When the responsiveness
to both medical and patient effort is high patients are drawn from all four other locations
to traditional healers, but mostly from government centers.
The analysis of the advantages of visiting different providers suggested 4 hypotheses: pa-
tients visit high effort providers when they need medical effort; they seek outcome-contingent
contracts when they need both medical and patient effort; they seek high capacity providers
when they need capacity and they prefer to travel shorter distances if they can. Combining
this with evidence that government facilities are low effort facilities and missions are high
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effort facilities, I suggested that traditional healers provide more effort than government
facilities and might provide more effort than mission facilities. The results agree with the
hypotheses and suggest that traditional healers indeed do provide more effort than govern-
ment centers, and effort on par with mission centers. More importantly, an important feature
of the outcome-contingent contract and the practices of traditional healers as described in
section 1.1 is confirmed in the data: healers work with patients better than modern providers.
5 Conclusions
Traditional healers do not possess any super-natural power nor do they cheat their clients;
they use important elements of their practice to credibly deliver unobservable medical effort
and therefore high quality care. One view of traditional healers had suggested that they
serve only the poor; that they serve the ignorant who do not know better; that they cure
patients who are not really sick; or that they take advantage of a temporary placebo effect.
This paper has shown that, although poorer people visit traditional healers more often than
the non-poor this is almost entirely due to a geographic effect in which the bulk of the
poor have larger additional travel costs to other providers. Visitors to traditional healers
are more educated than the average patient and it therefore seems unlikely they are more
ignorant. Visitors to traditional healers are most often people who would have visited a
mission hospital or clinic if they had not gone to a traditional healer. They are the sicker
and harder to cure patients, not the easier ones. Interactions with a traditional healer are
extended over long periods of time because payments are often delayed. If healers sought a
temporary placebo effect, they would avoid such lengthy interactions. The model advanced
in this paper assumes that traditional healers have no extraordinary power, and this model
has reasonable predictive power. By Occam's razor, therefore, I reject the theory that healers
use magic to cure their patients. The magic in traditional medicine is implementation not
medicine.
The analysis of this paper is based on one area of one country in Africa. This province
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is relatively wealthy (though the roads are not good), and government practitioners in the
area are better than average (due to the regular supply of drugs). This paper cannot reach
definitive conclusions for all of Africa. None-the-less, the fact that the practices of healers
observed replicate the findings of anthropologists throughout Africa suggests that the same
problems are being solved in the same manner throughout Africa.
I have advanced an image of patients as active agents in their own health; they process
important information before seeking care and react to the incentives they face to provide
effort in their own care. It is easy to criticize the apparent ignorance of modern providers
to this characteristic of patients, but this attitude is near universal in health care; it is not
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A Mathematical Exposition of Health Care Model
The health production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form, wh = ApavnP, where a is the
responsiveness to patient effort and (3 the responsiveness to medical effort. I assume that
Q + (3 < 1. A is a shift term, containing a number of other factors. Utility is thus Ap^mP — p.
A.I Full Information
Under full information both medical and patient effort are supplied to the point where their
marginal benefit is equal to their marginal cost. Maximizing utility with respect to medical
and patient effort we obtain optimal patient effort (pFI), optimal medical effort (mFI) and
full information utility (UFI)-
(4a)
(4b)
UF1 = (1 - a) (AaapP)*=*=* (4c)
A.2 Traditional Healer
With the traditional healer utility is (1 — r)ApamP — p. The net payment to the traditional
healer is rApam^ — m. Using a Nash solution concept we obtain:
PTH = PFI(1 - r)((l - r ) V ) r a (5a)
™TH = rn^r((l -
 r)ar^)^^ (5b)
UTH = UFl(l - r)((l - r ) V ) ^ (5c)




The patient again retains the full utility of her health minus the disutility of effort, Apa7n^—p.
The payment to the practitioner is less obvious. I assume q = zAmP and the practitioner's
income is zAm13 — m. The patient contribution to health is assumed (incorrectly) to be
constant, z is fixed at each location and will be lower at a government provider than at a
mission provider. Optimal efforts and the subsequent utility are therefore:
(Aa^/jVjci-wi-") (6a)
m*p = (zA/3)^ (6b)
Uip = irFI(^)( i-°<K i-0) (6c)
PFI
z is a scalar and does not vary with either a or /3. When z is coincidentally equal to
(PFi)a utility is equal to the full information utility. If organizations were perfectly informed
they could set a different z for each illness and always achieve the optimal solution. Since z
is fixed, utility could potentially exceed full information utility for some values of pFI and fall
short for other values. Leonard and Zivin (2000) explores a model in which z varies according
to illness condition but the organization assumes that patient effort does not vary (z = pQ,
where p is the institution's guess on a constant level of patient effort.) The conclusions of
that model are the same as those given below.
A.4 Difference between traditional healers and institutional providers
The difference between the utility at a traditional healer and an institutional provider (as-
suming the same skill and other costs) is:
FI
 V PFI /
We cannot sign this equation without knowledge of z. Equation (8) gives the value of z
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for which the two utilities are equal, z.
" r)1"^ ((1 - r ) V ) ^ ) a (8)
When z = z, UTB — UIP — 0. Thus, by definition, if z > z the utility of visiting an institutional
provider is larger than the utility of visiting a traditional healer (ignoring other costs). If
z < z the utility of visiting a traditional healer is larger, z is fixed for each institution, but
z varies according to a and (3 (among other things).. Thus it is possible that z > i\ for
condition 1, but that z < z~2 for condition 2. In order to be able to say which conditions are
most likely to lead to z>z or z<z,I explore the properties of z.
dz Q(1 — 3) , , . . , .
^^+^) (9a)
il
 + 1) (9b)
d2z a(l - (3)z
dad/3 (l - a - pf
(lnm*Ta + 1 + (1 + lnp*H)a (lnm*TU - ( 1 " a " ^ ~ r) + ^ | ) ) (9c)
For the standard properties of a Cobb-Douglas production function to hold (output is
increasing in both a and /?), medical and patient effort must both be greater than 1. However,
I cannot simply assume this since efforts are determined endogenously. For them both to
be greater than 1, A must be 'large.' Thus, health care is valuable. If A is not 'large' not
seeking health care is preferable to seeking health care. I assume that A is large enough so
that both p* and ra* are greater than one. Since ln(l — r) < 0 we can sign the derivatives
as follows: f > 0, § > 0, and £§^ > 0.
Recall that z is fixed for both government and mission providers. If traditional healers
provide higher levels of effort than government facilities (z for the government is relatively
low) the probability of visiting a traditional healer will be higher when a and (3 are larger.
The same holds for mission facilities. In addition, traditional healers have a greater compar-
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ative advantage when a and (5 are simultaneously large.
B Illness Condition Characteristics
Table 7 shows the correlation between illness codings of the responsivenesses to medical and
patient effort. The responsiveness to medical effort should be correlated with itself across
the four codings and the responsiveness to patient effort should also be correlated with
itself. The responsiveness to medical effort from medical references is significantly positively
correlated with all other codings, and the responsiveness is significantly positively correlated


















































Table 8 shows the correlation between codings of the capacity of the three levels of prac-
titioners. We expect the responsiveness to capacity at any given level to be correlated across
codings. In fact we find that the benefit to an untrained practitioner as given by medical
references is negatively correlated with A, positively correlated with B, and uncorrelated
with C. The responsiveness to capacity at a clinic for the medical references is correlated
with A, and uncorrelated with either B or C. The responsiveness to capacity at a hospital
for medical references is significantly positively correlated to all centers.
Table 9 shows the correlation across centers for the range in outcomes. The coding from
37




































































































significant at 10% (*)
medical references is significantly positively correlated across all centers.



















significant at 10% (*)
Table 10 shows the prevalence of symptoms reported to each practitioner. Reported
are the number of episodes in which that symptom was found as well as the deviation in
percentage points of the observed against the predicted percentage of visits. If the proportion
of visits with a given symptom is equal to the total proportion of patients visiting that
practitioner, the deviation is zero.
Table 11 shows the results of a regression of assigned codes (for the medical references)
against symptoms, patient and episode characteristics. Symptoms are listed in decreasing
order of prevalence and include only those symptoms with at least 10 observations.
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Table 10: Symptom Prevalence by Provider














































































































































































































































































































































* indicates %2 test of independence rejected at 10% significance level with the
null that all symptoms are found in the same proportion at all practitioners
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